Quantum secure message authentication via blind-unforgeability


Christian Majenz

Joint work with Gorjan Alagic, Alexander Russell and Fang Song

QCrypt 2018, Shanghai, China











JOINT CENTER FOR Quantum Information and Computer Science







Problem: how can Bob check if a message came from Alice and is unchanged?




Alice	Bob
m k	k




Bob		
	k	





Problem: how can Bob check if a message came from Alice and is unchanged? **Solution:** message authentication code (MAC) (some efficient function **Mac**)



Note: Bob is only checking consistency with the function .

What properties should a MAC satisfy to be secure?


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
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"malleability" attacks:

$$(m, \operatorname{Mac}_k(m)) \longrightarrow (m', \operatorname{Mac}_k(m'))$$

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
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



Key property: *unpredictability* of Mac_k .















Success: *i*) $m^* \neq m_i$ for all i = 1,...,q*ii*) $\operatorname{Mac}_k(m^*) = t^*$


A message authentication code is secure, if no successful forger exists:



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


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
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$$m_1 = \sum_{m \in \{0,1\}^n} |m\rangle |0\rangle$$
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ii) Measure in the computational basis to obtain $(m, \operatorname{Mac}_k(m))$ for random m
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EUF-CMA doesn't make sense anymore...

Quantum

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A good predictor: key *k* specifies a random periodic function f_k with period p_k $\mathbf{Mac}_k(p_k) = 0$, and $\mathbf{Mac}_k(x) = f_k(x) \ \forall x \neq p_k$

```
i) run period finding to find p_k
ii) output (p_k, 0)
```

Boneh Zhandry unforgeability


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
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
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
Has some nice properties:

- Equivalent to EUF-CMA for classical oracle
- A random function is BZ-unforgeable (BZ '13)

The right definition?




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


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
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In fact, it seems like it should be *easy* to find examples like this! It's not, though. Is our intuition right? One obstacle: "property finding" cannot be used.


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- Define $f_0^A(x) = \bigoplus f_0(x \oplus a)$
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- MAC: $Mac_k(bx) = f_b^A(x)$ with $k = (f_0, f_1, A)$.




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
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Theorem (AMRS17). There are no efficient quantum algorithms which query Mac_k once but output two distinct input-output pairs of Mac_k .

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A new approach: "blind unforgeability." (AMRS17)

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More formally: for Mac_k

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
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Definition (Blind-Unforgeability): A MAC Mac_k is blind-unforgeable if for every adversary \mathscr{A} with a quantum oracle for B_cMac_k

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
1. prepare: $m_1 = \sum_{m \in \{0,1\}^n} |m\rangle |0\rangle$; 2. query 3. measure Output: $(m, B_{\varepsilon} \operatorname{Mac}_k(m))$ for random m.

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Check, e.g., for random functions:

- if oracle is blinded...
- ... Mac_k(m) for blinded m is *independent* of post-query state,
- this adversary fails.



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
random Simon problem (but with large subgroup) f_0^A

a function which is only forgeable by sampling

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
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
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
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
Check, say for $\varepsilon = 0.0001$,

- oracle is blinded only on few random inputs...
- ...post-query state won't change too much;

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
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


One-query attack: Fourier sample orange part, forge in olive part.

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- The Fourier sample is blinded with independent probability *c*;
- so this adversary succeeds!





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- A construction of a collapsing hash function based on LWE by Unruh (ASIACRYPT 16) is actually even Bernoulli-preserving

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Outlook

What's next?

- did we solve the problem?
- is blind-unforgeability the "right" notion of unforgeability against quantum adversaries?
- maybe: it does the right thing on all the examples we could think of;
- maybe not: it seems hard to prove that it implies BZ (does that matter?); we can come up with lots of seemingly inequivalent variants of BU.

In general: we need to develop and refine new techniques for quantum query complexity to suit "crypto needs", e.g. to analyze

- 1. algorithms which only succeed on a small space of inputs;
- 2. algorithms which succeed with vanishing (but non-negligible) probability;
- non-asymptotics: problems with an "easy/impossible" thresholds of one (or few) queries.